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Introduction
In Fall of 2009 five Al Qa"ida operatives were arrested by federal authorities while in the final stages of separate operational plans to conduct attacks within the United States. 2, 3, 4, 5 Clearly, law enforcement was aware of their activities. Others within the United States intelligence community were aware of who some of the individuals were and of their relationships with Al Qa"ida, but they had no knowledge of the specific plots that were underway. 6 Alarmingly, The Adjutants General (TAGs) of the states where the plots were unfolding were unaware of these activities until the individuals were arrested and the stories hit the press. 7, 8 This is significant because the National Guard plays a key role in the American Homeland Security (HLS) enterprise, principally in response to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive (CBRNE) event. Yet, they typically lack sufficient access to potentially vital information that is available via other channels until after it hits the press or has become operationally irrelevant.
These events highlight a major flaw in the current information and intelligence sharing paradigm, particularly as it pertains to the National Guard. What if these men hadn"t been arrested? What if they had successfully executed their attacks? The Guard would have been one of the last to know despite being one of the principle first responders to a potential terrorist event. How many lives would have been lost in the name of maintaining the stovepipes and firewalls between the intelligence and law enforcement worlds? More importantly, how can this flaw be corrected?
The National Guard lacks a fundamental understanding of the role of intelligence as a result of the historical security paradigm within the United States. This paradigm created a culture so averse to domestic intelligence operations and so deferential to the civil liberties and personal freedoms of Americans that in some instances it imperils them. An oft-asked question since 9/11 is, how many civil liberties are Americans willing to forgo in order to secure their freedoms? For most Americans the obvious answer to that question, as the flurry of post 9/11 legislation and vast changes to America"s HLS landscape clearly shows, is "more than what they currently are". Through nearly its entire history, the Guard has been a domestic force with a mission that could best be described as a strategic reserve primarily operating within the borders of the U.S. The longstanding sensitivities of the American public regarding domestic intelligence operations and the Guard"s citizen-soldier history, led the Guard, understandably, to minimize its intelligence footprint as much as possible.
In 2004 the 9/11 Commission recommended several changes to the dominant information sharing and homeland security paradigm in its final report to Congress. It identified 41 recommendations to help prevent another terrorist attack on the U.S. and of those 41, six pertain specifically to information sharing; more than any other single topic. 9 Since 9/11, a number of significant foundational documents and key organizations have stood up in the U.S. to enable the fusion of information and intelligence urged by the 9/11Commission. John Rollins of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) emphasizes the relative weight assigned to these intelligence and information fusion concepts noting, "All major post 9/11 government reorganizations, legislation, and programs have emphasized the importance of intelligence in preventing, mitigating, and responding to future terrorist attacks." The JFHQs are the National Guards" operational coordinating entity and consequently, would be responsible for coordinating any Guard response to a terrorist event. Unfortunately, the intelligence officer, or J2, is not a high priority in most JFHQs and in many cases is not even a full-time position. In other instances, the J2 is not a trained and certified intelligence officer.
Despite the many reforms since 9/11, the Guard intelligence enterprise remains alarmingly detached from the rest of the HLS community jeopardizing its ability to achieve sufficient situational awareness and adequately posture Guard HLS assets to respond to a potential terrorist act within the U.S. This paper first addresses the current homeland security landscape as it pertains to the National Guard: detailing the role the Guard has been directed to play and the legal landscape undergirding what the National Guard can and cannot do in terms of HLS operations. Second, it proposes a potential solution to the problem of better connecting the National Guard into the larger HLS community by integrating National Guard intelligence personnel into the existing state fusion center (SFC) enterprise. Finally, an assessment of the objectives, advantages, and second-order effects of this action is included.
Research Process
This paper uses standard archival research citing a broad array of publically available sources. Additionally, a number of personal, e-mail interviews were conducted by the author with various state Adjutants General and members of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) staff.
An effort was made to contact individual JFHQ-State J2s but most were unavailable or unable to respond within the timelines provided. The author relies heavily on personal experiences while Commission hoped to avoid. The Commission implied that to effectively achieve fusion of intelligence and law enforcement information, it is necessary to have representation from all principle stakeholders working side by side on a daily basis. However, according to a 2008 CRS report, "While many of the centers have prevention of attacks as a high priority, little "true fusion," or analysis of disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps, and proactive collection of intelligence against those gaps which could contribute to prevention is occurring." Guard intelligence personnel are required to comply with all federal IO rules without exception. However, before one can understand how IO policy affects the National Guard, there are a number of issues that must be understood regarding the duty status of Guardsmen, the concept of "intelligence activities" and the latitude that IO policy actually provides, enabling intelligence personnel to do their jobs legally in a domestic environment. IO policy is complex but for the purposes of this paper, there are two key elements of note. First, properly authorized intelligence personnel engaged in intelligence activities on a USPERS must conduct their activities using the least intrusive means. 22 Second, intelligence personnel have 90 days to determine whether intelligence on a USPERS they may have collected or used is germane to the mission. If so, they may proceed in accordance with their mission otherwise, they must destroy the information and cease any further operations against that USPERS. Short of these two considerations, there is no legal impediment to Guard intelligence personnel working in an SFC and fusing intelligence and law enforcement information. The issue is not whether the Guard should be involved with the details of ongoing terrorism investigations within the U.S. However, as the designated DOD first-responder to CBRNE contingencies and a potential source of security and force protection in the region, they should be made aware that there are investigations underway and who the principals are. To be prepared to respond to or avoid a terrorist attack the Guard needs some basic facts and general situational awareness of potential trouble spots. In most cases, the law enforcement community is fully aware and often actively engaged in thwarting plans of potential terrorists. What happens if they miss one, as in the recent case of Mohammed Abdul Mutallab, the Christmas Day bomber who attempted to blow up a civilian airliner over the United States? National Guard leadership cannot properly posture and/or position assets to deal with the potential aftermath of a successful attack without access to information on the current operating environment. The fact is, in most cases that access is lacking.
Current State of Affairs
Several TAGs share these concerns. When asked whether they felt they had sufficient access to intelligence, particularly intelligence regarding homeland threats, there was a general sense of agreement amongst TAGs. 25 Major General Todd Bunting, TAG of Kansas, responded with an emphatic "no". "This is true in regards to both tactical and strategic intelligence, fully understanding that intelligence products are never absolute. Conversely, intelligence inherently assumes a predictive, forward looking posture being tasked to provide the current threat picture and assess likely future enemy actions. This is not to debate the merits of either, indeed, the 9/11 Commission states both are needed to develop the best possible picture of the threat. The 9/11 Commission"s intent behind the SFCs was to collocate law enforcement and intelligence personnel. The Guard responded by collocating military and civilian law enforcement personnel, forgoing the intelligence piece, thus missing the whole point.
A Possible Solution
A possible solution to this problem is to integrate National Guard JFHQ-State J2s into the SFCs affording them regular and systematic access to relevant intelligence and law enforcement derived data pertaining to potential terrorist threats to the individual states as well as the larger homeland in general. Moreover, it affords them the opportunity to participate in the interagency analysis that goes on within the HLS community and to bring more fidelity to the federal threat picture via additional inputs from the state and local level. Such a move could provide not only National Guard leadership, but leadership across the whole of government, with a substantially improved view of the threat landscape and a better opportunity to coordinate response options with partners and stakeholders at all levels; the stated intent of the 9/11 Commission. This is a solution TAGs could enact on their own accord, there is nothing stopping them. The Guard must be willing to shift priorities within the JFHQ-State staffs. If they ever hope to have the situational awareness necessary to posture and/or respond to a terror attack, it is an absolute imperative that the Guard appropriately man the JFHQ-J2 positions with trained, qualified, experienced, full-time intelligence professionals and imbed them inside the SFCs.
Impediments to Integration
The Guard has yet to make intelligence a priority. Most of the JFHQ-J2s do not have access to Top Secret intelligence specific to homeland threats either due to lack of equipment or lack of adequate clearances. 31 clearances to see most of the vital homeland security related intelligence that is available and which often affects them. 35 When coupled with the fact their respective JFHQ-J2s may be equally constrained, it becomes extremely problematic to expect TAGs to have a suitable level of situational awareness to properly posture and/or position their forces for the purpose of either force protection or disaster response. In short, they are being asked to make decisions without the benefit of much of the key information needed.
Despite overwhelming evidence that the Guard requires access to key homeland security related intelligence, it is the only organization with a sizeable role in homeland security lacking the vital intelligence it needs. For a number of reasons, some self-inflicted, some bureaucratic, and some technical, the National Guard lacks day-to-day access to and is denied the daily collaborative analytical exchange on the vast stores of homeland security-related information/intelligence currently available within the Intelligence Community (IC).
Conclusions
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States is very clear and unambiguous regarding how the U.S intends to combat terrorism and foster a more secure homeland, "To prevent acts of terrorism on American soil, we must enlist all of our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities. We will continue to integrate and leverage state and major urban area fusion centers that have the capability to share classified information; establish a nationwide framework for reporting suspicious activity; and implement an integrated approach to our counterterrorism information systems to ensure that the analysts, agents, and officers who protect us have access to all relevant intelligence throughout the government. We are improving information sharing and cooperation by linking networks to facilitate Federal, state, and local capabilities to seamlessly exchange messages and information, conduct searches, and collaborate (emphasis added).
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Consistent with all post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism (CT) policy guidance, the NSS advocates sharing all relevant CT information across all levels of government. The IC, DOD, and DHS have made tremendous strides in moving towards this goal. The development of a robust community of SFCs coupled with ongoing efforts to develop policy that supports sharing are merely the first steps. Short of the technological hurdles currently impeding a robust and efficient HLS enterprise, the next step in meeting the objectives of the 9/11Commission is to ensure those who are tasked with defending the homeland, the citizen-soldiers of our nation, have appropriate access to the same information that is already being shared by other parts of the HLS enterprise.
Part of the solution is for TAGs to seize the initiative and act by re-prioritizing their manpower and properly resourcing their intelligence capabilities. There are no legal constraints though there may be some funding constraints but ultimately, where there"s a will there"s a way.
The Guard is assuming more and more of DOD"s HLS responsibilities and USNORTHCOM has reached out to them to work more closely. Now is the time for National Guard intelligence personnel to be integrated into SFCs. It will enable a better preventive posture against possible terrorist operations in the homeland and, in response to those operations it will ensure a better coordinated response across the spectrum of government by first responders. Additionally, it further minimizes the traditional stovepipes that have represented the operational norm between and within the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
Failing any new policy directives, the issues highlighted in this paper will continue to pose a risk to our nation"s defense. The fear is that rather than correcting the problem, we will continue to march forward with our stovepipes and we will once again find ourselves a nation enthralled with the televised activities of yet another congressionally mandated post-disaster commission. We will once again hear testimony telling how we failed to connect the dots and fuse the intelligence. We will hear how we lacked the imagination to consider that the enemy might attack us in some new way. 
